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Internal labor markets are those where workers are hired into entry level jobs and higher levels are
filled from within. Wages are determined internally and may be quite free of market pressure.
External labor markets imply that workers move somewhat fluidly between firms and wages are
determined by some aggregate process where firms do not have significant discretion over wage
setting. There are a number of theories that lead to internal labor markets. Using data from Sweden
from the late 1980s, it is found that although there is significant evidence of internal promotion
being important, a significant external market exists that affects both wage setting and hiring
patterns. Even in Sweden, which most would not choose as the best example of a free labor market,
external factors seem to create strong discipline on the ability of firms to set wages.
Edward P. Lazear 
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How fluid are labor markets?  Most economists believe that fluidity of labor markets is a
necessary condition for competition to prevail.  Without at least the potential for significant
mobility across firms, the concern arises that workers will be locked into their firms and as a
result, may be subject to exploitation.
Indeed, Adam Smith worried about this exact issue. He argued that scarcity of labor
would break any hold that employers had over their workers and would thereby eliminate their
power to hold wages down.  Smith wrote,
1
“The scarcity of hands occasions a competition among masters, who bid against one
another in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily break through the natural
combination of masters not to raise wages.”  
There are two kinds of fluidity that are of issue in modern labor markets - ex ante and ex
post.  “Ex post fluidity” (by which we mean fluidity of the labor market for workers with at least
a fair amount of tenure at a given firm) relates most closely to internal labor markets.  Because
workers eventually tend to settle down and remain with a particular employer for a significant
fraction of their careers, the pattern of early mobility, coupled with later stability, may reflect the
importance of internal labor markets, where workers are hired into “ports-of-entry” and higher
level positions are filled from within.
2   A variety of factors could account for such a lack of
mobility, including firm-specific human capital, incentive structures, or pure institutional factors. 2
One potential implication of ex post rigidity is that wages do not move with the market.
“Ex ante fluidity” refers to the flexibility of labor markets for workers at the start of a
career. Even if strong internal labor markets exist, it may well be the case that labor markets are
competitive at the time of hire into the entry level position.  For example, before a worker signs
on with a firm and has acquired firm-specific skills, he or she may have many choices across
firms, and the ability to join a number of different firms would have implications at least for the
expected present value of lifetime wages that a firm would have to offer at the entry point.  But it
is also possible that there is a lack of fluidity even at the entry level.  For example, in a heavily
unionized country or industry, hiring may be determined in large part by union rules that make it
difficult for certain individuals to obtain specific jobs.  Often, the rules relate to seemingly
sensible job-related factors such as skills, but it is also possible that such constraints may simply
be instruments that unions use to create  monopoly rents for the members.  Government
restrictions, such as minimum wages, may also be important at the entry level.
The personnel economics approach is most useful at shedding light on ex post fluidity. 
Personnel economics is a sub-discipline that uses the tools of economic theory and econometrics
to examine issues that are of interest in the human resources arena.  Much of the literature has
focused on internal labor markets and on the structure of compensation within firms.  The
theories and approach of that literature will be of direct applicability in analyzing labor market
fluidity.  
Before proceeding, it is important to point out that an external labor market that results
from a fluid labor environment is not the same as an efficient market. For example, suppose that
the government were to set a minimum wage well above the level that would prevail in an3
unfettered competitive market. There might be complete mobility between firms, and
competition among firms would prevent any single firm from setting wages that were out of line
with the market. But the resulting use of labor would not be efficient. Instead, it would suffer
from distortions caused by the minimum wage. Strong centralized union wage setting could
create similar inefficiencies, even if there were competition between firms for labor.  As such, it
is better to talk about external and internal labor markets than about competition and efficiency.
The question that is posed in this paper is narrower than whether wages and labor
markets are competitive.  The analysis asks whether positions are frequently filled from outside
the firm or whether they must be filled by incumbents, except at the firm’s ports-of-entry. 
Second, the analysis aims to determine how much discretion firms have in wage setting.  If labor
markets were truly internal, there would be no automatic connection between the wages in one
firm and the wages in another, even for the same job.  
Using data from Sweden, it is found that labor markets are “fluid” in two senses.  First, at
every level of the firm’s hierarchy, a significant fraction of positions are filled from the outside. 
Despite institutional limitations on firing workers, there is enough turnover so that the typical
firm can and does go to the external labor market to fill positions.  Second, wages are determined
primarily by factors that are exogenous to the firm.  At least in the long run, the wages paid by
the typical firm are determined by prevailing wages in the market, not by conditions in the firm. 
In the short run, firm effects are most important, but over the longer haul, market considerations
discipline the ability of firms to set wages.  Once again, this does not imply efficiency, because
the “market” wage might well be determined in an institutional and non-competitive manner. 
But it does imply that the firm does not have significant power to exploit workers relative to the4
market.
This result is somewhat surprising, particularly in a country like Sweden where wage
setting occurs in large part in a formal and institutional way.  Of course, were wages completely
determined centrally, at least the wage results would be less of a surprise.  Centralized wage
setting would guarantee that firms’ wages paralleled the market.  But this is not the whole story. 
Although 82% of individual worker wages can be explained by job, region, firm and year effects,
the other 18% is worker specific variation.  The firm variable only accounts for about one
percent of the variation in wages among workers  Thus, in the presence of significant
idiosyncratic wage setting, the market wage for the job is more important than the firm in
determining the long run wage level.
The conclusion is that even in the European environment where wage and employment
determination are constrained by institutional factors, external labor markets are prevalent and
forceful. Although promotion from within is the rule at most higher level positions in most firms, 
positions are often filled from outside the firm, and the wages paid are those determined by the
general market conditions, not by the firm.
I. Ports-of-Entry, Promotion and Wage Setting
Three factors bear on the importance of internal labor markets and ex post fluidity.  They
are the hiring process, the promotion process, and the pattern of wage setting. If an internal labor
market exists, then there must be some jobs, presumably at high levels, that are filled almost
exclusively through internal promotion and there must be other ports-of-entry jobs, presumably3The notion that there may be ports-of-entry dates back at least to Reder’s (1955) analysis
of job ladders and received additional attention in Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) book on internal
labor markets.
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at low levels, that are filled through external hiring.
3 The existence of ports-of-entry is not a
sufficient condition for insulated labor markets, however. Even if workers were hired only into
the lowest level job in the firm and stayed in the same firm their entire lives, and even if all
higher positions in the firm were filled through promotion from below, it is still possible that an
external labor market for labor could prevail at all firms. Consider the most extreme case, where
all firms are identical and all human capital is completely general. Once hired into a firm, there
is no reason for a worker to move to any other firm. Promotions reflect changes in human
capital, but workers need not be locked into the firm.  Any attempt to exploit a worker by forcing
him to accept a wage below the market wage would result in turnover.  Such events might never
be observed in equilibrium, however, because firms understand that they have no market power
over the worker and always pay the competitive wage.
It is therefore necessary to complement the information on promotion with an analysis of
wages. If all markets are external labor markets, then all wages should move together once job
and skill have been sufficiently well defined.  A change in the market wage should be reflected
in a complete and parallel change in the wage of workers at any given firm.  Thus, by examining
the sensitivity of wages to the “benchmark” spot wage, it is possible to assess whether firms’
behavior is consistent with spot or internal labor markets.  Wage movements that are parallel for
parallel jobs are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for spot labor markets.  Wages may
move together even if firms set up internal labor markets. Consider another extreme example.
Suppose that all firms are identical, that all firms set up long term contracts with their workers6
reflecting some relationship-specific value (such as specific human capital, union contracts, or
implicit lifetime incentive contracts), and that some exogenous shock changes the optimal
structure of the lifetime wage profile. Because all firms are identical, all firms will change their
profiles in exactly the same way so that wages at any given job will move in parallel.  Yet an
internal labor market exists in that if a worker were to leave his current firm, he would not be
able to receive the same wage at a new firm because it is only his initial firm that has an implicit
contract to repay him for the loan that he has already given to that firm.
Figure 1 summarizes how the following analysis of hiring and wages identifies the level
of labor market fluidity. To the extent that evidence can be provided on both the common
movement of wages and the patterns of hiring and internal promotion, light can be shed on the
prevalence of spot or internal labor markets.  If both wage movement is largely firm-specific and
if more senior workers are primarily promoted from within, or if neither of these conditions
holds, then firm conclusions can be drawn.  The combination that results in the upper right
corner, where wages move together but slots at the top of the firm are filled from within, rules
out neither internal labor markets nor external labor markets.  The lower left corner is
inconsistent with both because internal labor markets require that most high level positions are
filled from inside and external labor markets requires that wages move together.
Prior economic studies of how firm hierarchies evolve and of the relationship between
firm and market wages have been limited by the lack of data with detailed information on the
entire structure of firms.  While hierarchies of individual firms have been analyzed, it is unclear
how well the patterns observed in these studies generalize to the large set of firms in the4See Lazear (1992) and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) for economic studies of
private sector firms. See Barnett, Baron, and Stuart (2000) for a study of a large government
bureaucracy.
5Gibbs, Ierulli, and Milgrom (2002) use the same data to study factors that drive
employees to move between levels, change firms, or change occupations. While both papers
study across-firm and within-firm transitions, this paper considers the hierarchies and sources of
workers from the firm’s perspective rather than focusing on the workers’ careers.
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economy.
4 The following empirical analysis addresses both dimensions of Figure 1, using data
that cover almost all white-collar workers at a group of firms that account for about 40% of the
Swedish labor market during the 1970s and 1980s.
5 It appears that the labor market is in large
part competitive.  Although most firms fill most high level positions from inside, almost all firms
engage in a significant amount of outside hiring, even at the highest levels of the firm. 
Additionally, the analysis of wage movements is most consistent with a competitive labor
market, where wages for given jobs largely move together.
II. Theoretical Background
The simplest view of the labor market is one where all human capital is general. Then
mobility could occur at every level of the firm’s hierarchy and wages could reflect productivity. For
example, though some universities have a comparative advantage in training assistant professors,
those schools need not retain all their trainees.  When assistant professors have acquired the requisite
knowledge, they move to other universities and enter as associate or full professors.  Human capital
in academics, particularly at the research end, is general, so movement into jobs even at high levels
seems natural.  Long-term contracts are unnecessary and in fact have no role in this purest form.
External labor markets allocate labor perfectly, and there is no reason, save mobility costs, for there6One widely analyzed theory of labor market power is monopsony, which can arise from
search, geographical lock in, or other causes. Though this is probably important in certain market
segments, it seems unlikely to permeate the entire national labor market studied here. For a
detailed analysis and summary of monopsony, see Manning (2003).
7Lazear (2003) offers another approach to firm-specific human capital that is based solely
on general skills that are transferable across firms.
8Note that, while firm-specific human capital could lead to entry into certain jobs, the
theory actually does not require that employees change job titles or levels.
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to be any permanent attachment to a firm.
             Many labor markets are not so simple, however, and a number of theories give rise to ports-
of-entry and to firms not needing to be perfectly responsive to market-wide wage changes. Although
some of these theories involve market power by one party, most involve situations of competition
at the hiring stage followed by the development of relationship-specific value.
6
A classic reason for internal labor markets is firm-specific human capital, which dates back
to Becker (1962).  Once a worker acquires firm-specific human capital, his value inside the firm
deviates from that at other firms, which creates a situation of ex post bilateral monopoly.
7 The firm
must offer new workers a competitive long-term contract, with a present value equal to the present
value of the worker’s value to the firm. At any point in time after the start of the contract, the present
value of the remaining wages must equal or exceed the present value of the alternative wages
obtainable. But there is no need for the firm to fully adjust workers’ wages exactly to current market
rates once those workers have developed firm-specific human capital.
The theory of firm-specific human capital also provides a coherent story that might allow
for ports-of-entry. If high level jobs in the firm require more firm-specific knowledge than low level
ones, there is no way to acquire firm-specific knowledge other than spending time in the firm.
Workers are hired in at low levels and move up the hierarchy as they acquire skills.
89One exception is Gibbs (1995), who looks at tournaments that perform a sorting role.
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Another reason for long-term labor contracts where wages at a point in time deviate from
outside opportunities is incentives. One version of this idea is the upward sloping experience-
earnings profile (Lazear 1979), where deferred earnings provide workers with incentives to put forth
effort over their careers. Firms receive their surplus early in the career by paying workers less than
they are worth and pay workers back later in the career by paying them more than they are worth.
Once again, there is a deviation between wage and alternatives even though, over the worklife, the
present value of earnings equals the present value of productivity.
A related idea, and one that can lead to both ports-of-entry and deviations between internal
and market wages, is tournaments (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981.) In tournament theory, jobs are
defined as wage slots.  An individual enters the firm at one job level and is promoted to another if
he wins the tournament.  Losers remain in the same job.   There is no necessity that tasks differ in
the two jobs.  In fact, most of tournament theory makes little mention of tasks.
9  Promotions to
higher levels serve to motivate workers, so it is necessary that some workers come in at lower levels.
The model taken literally implies that the top level of the firm can only have workers who are
promoted because it serves no role other than to motivate those one level below. Although the
market is competitive, there is no direct connection between wage and worker output.
Worker-firm matching provides another framework in which worker wages can deviate ex
post from market wage offers. In Jovanovic (1979), the productivity of any worker/firm pair (or
“match”) is idiosyncratic.  If a match is sufficiently good, the worker is worth more to the current
firm than to outsiders and bilateral monopoly exists as the result of rents. Again, worker wages can10There are a number of variants on this model. Waldman (1984) is a well-known
example that focuses on the importance of private information.
11Alternatively, employer search costs can create differences between wages paid by a
given firm and the external labor market wage needed to hire a worker.  See Lindbeck and
Snower (1986).
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deviate from market alternatives.
10 
Pure search offers yet another reason. If there is a distribution of wages that exists purely as
a result of search costs, then some workers who are fortunate to find a firm that pays high wages will
not automatically have attractive alternative wage offers.
11 The search model and the matching
model neither require nor preclude ports-of-entry.
Finally, purely institutional factors can create wedges. A union that negotiates high wages
might create an environment where workers cannot readily obtain alternative employment at the
same wage. Alternatively, suppose workers are perfect substitutes for one another and that they rise
within organizations based only on seniority, nepotism, influence, and discrimination.  Thus, all
workers must come in at the bottom and acquire promotions by working the system for a long
enough period of time. In such a world, wages need not move very closely with market wages and
firms will have specific ports-of-entry. Note, however that this view allows little role for markets
and mobility.  Firms that run their businesses in an arbitrary fashion can be supplanted by those that
behave more rationally.  Only when firms (rather than just their workers) are very insulated from
market forces could such a system persist.
III. The Data
In much of the analysis that follows, the focus is on a “job” or occupation. In order to study12The Census Bureau has been engaged in an ambitious project to develop matched
employer-employee matched data. This data has been used in numerous studies (see, for
example, Abowd, Haltiwanger, Lane, and Sandusky, 2001) and has several features not generally
available in the European datasets. However, there is no detailed information on jobs so it is
impossible to examine the wage structure or promotion paths within firms.
13This data description borrows liberally from Meyersson Milgrom, Petersen, and
Snartland (2001).  See that paper for further details about the SAF data.
11
transitions between similar jobs at multiple firms or to determine how market-wide wages for a job
affect the wage for that job at an individual firm, it is necessary to have very detailed and consistent
data on jobs across a large sample of firms. While data of this sort do not exist for the United States,
there are a number of matched employer-employee datasets from European countries.
12 The data in
this study come from Sweden. The data were collected and provided by the Swedish Employers’
Confederation (SAF).
13  The SAF assembles very detailed and uniform data from establishment-
level personnel records. The firms span virtually every private sector industry (with the exception
of financial services). This study uses the SAF data for white-collar employees. In any given firm,
the data includes all white-collar workers, with the exception of the CEO and other members of the
executive team who negotiate their own wages rather than letting a union negotiate on their behalf.
Years of coverage are 1970-1990, inclusive. During that time, the data were used in annual wage
negotiations and were monitored by SAF and the relevant labor unions. Therefore, data quality is
very high and is likely to be much more accurate than standard surveys that rely on self-reported
wages.
The dataset’s firm and establishment characteristics include industry code, number of
employees, and region. Individual data include wage, age, gender, and a detailed occupation code.
The wage measure used in this study is base wage and refers to the normal pay for a 38-hour work12
week.
The occupation code, which is part of the Swedish occupational coding system and is known
as the “BNT” code, is a four-digit number that can be thought of as the person’s job title or “job.”
The first three digits of the occupation code, which is referred to as an “occupation family”
throughout this paper, determine the type of work the person does. There are 51 unique white-collar
occupation families.
The fourth digit of the occupation code, which is referred to as “level” throughout this
analysis, is a single digit that indicates the individual’s degree of responsibility and skill. In the
analysis that follows, “level” can take a value between 1 (lowest level) and 7 (highest level). In some
of the analysis, some of the levels are combined, but levels are always normalized so that the lowest
level at any given firm is one. Not all occupation families have seven levels, so the 51 occupation
families have a total of 285 occupation/level combinations.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of workers among these levels, as of 1988, at those firms that
have at least six of the possible seven levels. The bottom level is not the largest level. Rather, the
bottom few levels are quite small. As will be shown below, most employees skip the bottom levels.
Furthermore, there is no single level that serves as a port of entry.  There are many different entry
and promotion paths that exist in Swedish firms.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of wages in 1988
for the sample as a whole and Figure 4 shows the distribution at the largest firm (which is fairly
typical.) This distribution looks similar to the distribution of levels because, not surprisingly, wages
and levels are correlated. It is worth noting that wages and levels are far from perfectly correlated.
Levels are determined by tasks, not by pay. However, redefining job levels to be pay levels would
not materially affect the conclusions drawn below. Patterns in entry and movement among the wage13
distribution are similar to those across levels.
The exact tasks associated with each level for any given occupation are documented in
significant detail and, to the degree possible, are applied consistently across firms. Unions and the
SAF oversee this classification.  Because the data are used in wage negotiations, both sides have an
incentive to insure the integrity and comparability of the classifications.
These data have the advantage of covering many years and many different sizes of
companies. While that allows relatively general conclusions, it also presents numerous challenges.
First, not all firms have workers at each level and, even at those that do, some of the firm/level
observations are quite small. As a result, for some of the analysis, firms will be separated by the
number of levels represented at the firm. In other parts, analysis will focus only on firms with some
employees at one or both of the two highest levels and one or both of the two lowest levels. Finally,
when sizeable firm/job groups are necessary, only the 100 largest firms in the data are examined.
A second challenge is that, as a result of changes of ownership, data entry problems, or other
causes, there appear to be some false transitions in the data. For example, there are cases where a
firm with many employees is in the data in year t but not year t + 1. In year t + 1, another firm with
largely the same individual workers appears in the data for the first time or a firm that has been in
operation for several years before year t adds most of the employees from the firm that disappeared.
In an attempt to maximize the length over which individual workers are followed and to minimize
miscoded turnover, a variable called “family” is generated. Any two firms where more than half the
workers from one firm appear at the other firm in the next year are treated as being part of the same
family. If firms x and y and firm y and z are in the same families, a family is created including all
three of these firms and any other firm that has a family relationship with any individual firm.14
Finally, though up to twenty-one years of data are available for each firm, a significant
portion of the job observations are censored on one side or the other. In some of the analysis, the
level at which a person entered the firm for which he works is important. This information is not
available with certainty for many of the jobs observed. When relevant, the implications of this
censoring are considered in the discussion of the results.
IV. Empirical Analysis of Ports-of-Entry
A. Entry Level and Promotion
The first analysis considers the fraction of workers in a given level (as of 1988) at a given
firm who moved to that level from a different level in the same firm.  This analysis includes all
workers and all firms. There are seven possible levels, but not all firms have employees at each
level.  Each column in Panel A of Table 1 corresponds to firms that, as of 1988, had each number
of levels. In this table, levels are defined by the “BNT code” in the SFA data, as described above.
One problem presented by the BNT code levels, however, is that they are not necessarily comparable
across occupation families. That is, a level 2 job in one occupation could actually pay more and have
more responsibility than a level 3 job in another occupation. As a result, this table will make it
appear that demotions are more likely than they actually are. To insure that this comparability issue
does not affect our conclusions, an alternative definition of level is used in Panel B of the table, as
described below.
Panel A is based on employees’ 1988 level. The table shows how frequently employees had
previously been at a different level with this same employer. Employees who were already working15
in their current level when the firm first enters the dataset are dropped because how they transitioned
into their 1988 positions cannot be determined unambiguously.
Panel A of Table 1 makes it clear that the rate of external hiring relative to internal hiring
decreases monotonically at higher levels. For example, in firms with six or seven levels, over 80%
of employees in the top three levels moved to their current level from another level in the same firm.
A third or fewer of employees moved into their position internally at low levels of the organization,
however.
Panel B of Table 1 uses an alternative approach to perform the same analysis. Level is
defined using “Job/Wage Levels.” These were determined by calculating the average wage of the
285 BNT codes in 1988 and dividing the codes into five quintiles based on these averages. Job/Wage
Level 1 jobs are those in the lowest quintile of average wages, Job/Wage Level 2 jobs are in the
second lowest quintile, etc.  As in Panel A, the levels displayed in the table are actually level relative
to the lowest level at the firm. 3,568 of the firms in the sample employ workers that all fit into one
of these Job/Wage Levels. However, nearly 40% of the workers at these firms previously held a
position in another Job/Wage Level at their 1988 employer.
Though the definition of level in Panel B is very different from the definition in Panel A, the
conclusions are almost identical. At higher levels, the firm is more likely to fill positions internally.
However, at all Job/Wage Levels, a large set of employees are hired externally.
 Table 1 provides evidence that there are large differences in inside and outside hiring by
level.  The lower levels in the typical firm are much more likely to hire from the outside; the upper
levels are more likely to hire from within.  This is consistent with the notion that there are ports-of-
entry into the firm. Note, however, that even at the very high levels, a significant fraction of workers16
are hired from the outside.  In firms with the most levels (which hire the fewest from the outside at
top levels), approximately 12-15% of those in the highest level were hired directly from outside the
firm. 
As shown in Figure 2, the fourth level from the top - and not the bottom level - is the largest
in terms of number of employees in both 6 and 7 level firms.  Still, a relatively large proportion of
the workers in this modal position come in through promotion.  (Note that 65% are hired into the
modal position internally.) Thus, it appears that the middle levels are almost absorbing states; most
workers either get hired directly into these levels and stay there or get promoted from lower levels
to the middle levels and rarely move beyond.
  While Table 1 examines whether employees move into each level internally or externally,
Table 2 looks at where workers start in the firm relative to where they are at a given point in time.
To maximize the number of firms included in this analysis, the top two levels are combined and the
bottom two levels are combined.  Firms that do not have workers in both the top and bottom
(combined) levels are dropped.  
The second and third columns of Table 2 report the median and mean ratio of the number
hired into a level to the number in that level, where the unit of observation is a level within a firm.
Thus, the median is the ratio of the 50
th percentile firm ranked by (# hired into level) / (# in level in
1988).  For example, at level 4, a median of .50 is reported.  This implies that in the median firm,
half as many workers were hired into level 4 as are currently found in level 4.  The numbers are
higher at lower levels where more are hired in, relative to those who are still at that level.  The fourth
column reports the number of firms in the sample at each level.  The fifth column is the number in
the level at each firm, averaged across all firms.  “Cum. hired” is the number hired in that level or17
below.  “Cum. in level” is the total number in that level or below.  The last two columns are the
same values expressed as percentages, i.e., the cumulative distributions.
The last two columns highlight the difference between entry level and current level.  Fifty-
nine percent of the workers are hired in at one of the bottom two levels but only 31% worked in
those levels in 1988. The modal hiring level is 2 while the modal employment level is 3. At the
lowest level, the median firm has twice as many hired into level 1 as actually are employed at that
level.  The highest level is almost the mirror image of the bottom with the median firm employing
2 ½ times as many at that level as it hired in at that level. In summary, many more work in the top
level than are hired into it and many more are hired into the bottom level than work in it.
Table 3 displays three transition matrixes from entry level to 1988 level, focusing on the
same five levels as in Table 2.  Panel A displays the source of workers in 1988, regardless of
changes in “occupation families”, while Panel B looks only at transitions of workers who move up
and down within a single occupation. Panel C focuses on employees with at least ten years of service
at their 1988 employer. Panels A and B lead to similar conclusions, so we focus our discussion on
Panel A. The longer tenure employees in Panel C generate slightly different conclusions, as
discussed below.
Even for the highest level workers, more workers who are currently at level 5 entered at level
5 than at any other single level.  Of course, those who definitely entered at level 5 comprise less than
a quarter of those at that level, but it is clear that despite the existence of lower level entry and14 Strictly speaking, the current level is the modal entry level among those observations
where the entry level is known. Left censored observations are less likely to have entered in the
current level. As a result, at the highest levels, the current level may not be the true modal entry
level.
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upward mobility, entry from outside the firm is reasonably common, even at the top levels of the
typical organization.
14
The summaries under each panel provide a sense of the overall pattern of entry and mobility.
They compute the number and proportion of individuals along the diagonal, in the lower triangle and
in the upper triangle of each matrix.  Employees with unknown entry levels are excluded from this
calculation.  First, 52% of the Panel A observations lie along the diagonal, which means that 52%
of the individuals in the typical firm are currently at the same level as they entered.  It is striking that
46% are in the lower triangle, which means that 46% have been promoted at least one level.  Only
2% lie in the upper triangle, implying demotion (often due to changing occupation).  Thus, entry at
levels lower than those currently held is a very common pattern.
The picture that emerges from Tables 2 and 3 is that most individuals at any given firm were
hired into lower or middle levels of the firm and did some advancing to higher levels.  Almost 90%
of the typical firm’s workers were hired into levels 1, 2, or 3.  About 85% work in those three levels
at any point in time.  It is the middle levels of the firm that comprise most of the workforce.  The
lowest level is relatively small.
Even though disproportionately many are hired into the lowest levels, a substantial fraction
of the workforce makes its entry by being hired into the middle levels of the firm.  The modal
worker entry/current combination in Table 3 is the 3,3 cell. The second biggest cell is the 2,2 cell.
The number who enter at 2 and are promoted to higher levels exceeds the number who are hired into19
and remain at level 2.  Thus, the most important levels in the typical firm in terms of number of
employees also happen to be ports-of-entry, accounting for most of the hiring. These levels are both
jumping off points and destination jobs for a large part of the workforce.
Firms do not appear to have ports-of-entry in the standard sense. Most workers do not enter
at the bottom. For example, those who are currently in level 5 come in roughly even numbers from
levels 3, 4, and 5, but rarely from the two lowest levels.  Those who are currently at level 4 are most
likely to have entered at level 3, then level 4.  The general picture is that workers enter at or near the
position that they currently hold.  While some of these workers may still be promoted at some point
in the future, Table 3 provides a picture of internal and external transition from the firm’s point of
view.  For example, the (3,2) entry in the table, equal to 11,333, is large relative to the total in that
row.  About two-fifths of the workers who are employed at level 3 in 1988 and for whom the entry
level is known entered at level 2.  But it is also true that a slightly larger number (12,469) who
entered at level 2 are still at level 2.  Although some may eventually move up to level 3, it is clear
that at a point in time, many workers remain at the level at which they were hired into the firm. 
It may not be sufficient, when looking at transitions within firms, to use the entire sample
of workers at any given point. Many workers have recently entered their firm and will not have been
promoted at this point, while many others will only work for their current firm briefly. In order to
focus on workers more likely to have moved within their current employer Panel C of Table 3 shows
the same analysis as Panels A and B, but limits the sample to workers who have been with the firm
for ten years or more.  The picture changes somewhat, but the conclusions are remarkably similar.
There is still a significant portion of the workers along the diagonal.  About one-third of the workers
remain in the job levels into which they were hired.  A small fraction are demoted and almost two-15One change is that in levels 4 and 5, the modal level of hiring is now level 3.
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thirds of the workers have obtained at least one promotion during their time at the firm.  Thus, entry
with promotion is the most common pattern, but a sizeable fraction are hired into the job that they
will hold, perhaps for their entire lives.
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More can be understood by learning about the kinds of jobs that are represented by lowest
and middle levels.  The appendix provides descriptions of typical jobs in the data by major
occupation.   The occupation families are chosen to be among the largest numerically in the data.
In one occupation family (manufacturing), there are no level 1 jobs.  In construction and marketing,
the lowest level jobs are for workers who do the most mundane tasks.  For example, in construction,
a job that requires simple calculations regarding dimensions and materials is classified as level 3
(out of 7).  Most white-collar workers in construction are likely to be required to do some of these
simple calculations, which means that firms hire most of their basic white-collar workers into levels
3 or higher.  But the relationship is far from obvious because in both manufacturing and
construction, any worker at level 3 or above is required to have a number of subordinates, which
would suggest that there would be more below than at this level.  Part of this may have to do with
the data being restricted to white-collar workers.  In manufacturing in particular, the subordinates
might be blue-collar workers who do not show up in these data and therefore make the bottom of
the hierarchy appear narrower than it is.
Table 4 reports time in job. This is defined as number of years an employee stays in a
particular job (that is, 4-digit BNT code.) Employees who get promoted up a level, change
occupation families, or change firms are defined to be taking a new job.  Note that, because of the
nature of the data, this is reported separately for jobs that start and end within the time the firm is16 Many previous papers equate the term “tenure” with time spent at a given company.  
Here “job tenure” is defined as tenure in a job (that is, occupation family-level combination) at a
single firm. An employment spell at a single employer can be made up of several jobs, each with
its own job tenure.
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in the sample (“uncensored”), jobs that end during the sample but were already in progress when
the firm first enters the sample (“left censored”), jobs that begin during the sample but are still in
progress when the firm leaves the sample (“right censored”), and jobs that are censored on both
sides.
Table 4 demonstrates that the lowest levels in the firm tend to have the shortest job tenures.
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Low level jobs are common entry points, but they are also common exit points. Note that the average
tenure (uncensored) in level 1 jobs is about half that in level 5 jobs.  The same pattern holds, but to
a lesser extent in the censored data.  So workers do not spend much time in low level jobs.  At least
on average, they move to higher level jobs in the firm or they leave the firm.
The more interesting and perhaps surprising finding in Table 4 is that job tenure becomes
fairly constant above the lowest two levels. Average job tenures do not differ much among the top
three levels. Job tenure increases slightly at each increasing level until the highest level, when it
drops slightly. This suggests that many employees have long spells in middle levels of the typical
firm. It does not appear that firms are enforcing “up or out” policies, nor that employees who do not
get promoted regularly leave to seek better opportunities. Rather, it seems many workers settle into
a long spell in middle and upper-middle levels. This is more evidence that middle levels of the firm
act as semi-absorbing states.
While Table 4 provides a sense of how often transitions take place, Table 5 breaks those
transitions down into internal and external movement. The table reports average entry rates to and22
exit rates from a given firm/job. As in Tables 3 and 4, the top two levels are combined and the
bottom two levels are combined. Also, the sample is restricted to firms that have employees in the
top and bottom of the five possible levels.
Panel A of Table 5 analyzes the entire sample. Each person/year is an observation. For
example, of all the individuals in level 3 as of year t, 10.03% worked in a different firm in year t -
1 and 13.03% worked at another job in the same firm in year t - 1.  Also, 8.79% of the workers in
level 3 as of year t worked at another firm in year t + 1 and 10.75% worked in a different job at the
same firm in year t + 1. 
At lower levels of the typical firm, external entry is common while internal entry is not.  At
high levels, there is much less external entry. Similarly, it is very common for employees at the
lowest levels to move to another job within the firm. This internal exit becomes less common at each
increasing level within the firm.
The pattern in external exit is interesting and somewhat surprising.  Leaving the firm is less
common at the first few movements up in levels. However, only the levels 1 and 2 difference in
external entry is meaningful, as turnover is about one-fourth less common for level 2 workers than
for level 1 workers. Turnover is fairly stable for level 3 and 4 workers, relative to level 2. However,
workers at the top level are actually significantly more likely to leave their firm than workers at any
level other than the bottom. Combined with the results for level 5 in Table 4, it appears that the top
levels of the white-collar Swedish labor market are somewhat more fluid than middle levels.
Panel B of Table 5 limits the analysis to employees between the ages of 40 and 45. For this
older set of workers, the patterns are quite similar to those for the larger group. External exit rates
are lower than for the bigger sample, but at least 6% leave the typical firm at every level. Even for23
these workers who are more likely to have found stable matches, turnover is higher at the highest
level of the firm. Again, there appears to be a fairly robust market for senior managers.
One possible contributor to the exit rate patterns in Table 5 is documented by Holmlund and
Storrie (2002). They show that there has been an upward trend in the use of temporary workers in
Sweden in recent years.  This is unlikely to be driving the results in Table 5 because, as Holmlund
and Storrie (2002) show, the bulk of the increase in temporary workers came in the 1990s. Thus,
temporary workers were not as important in the period studied here. However, to insure temporary
workers are not dominating the exit rates in Table 5, the analysis was redone using only employees
who had been at their firms at least three years. The exit rates are about one percentage point lower
for both external and internal exits at each level and the conclusions are qualitatively similar. Were
entry and exit rate analyses, such as those in table 5 repeated for the 1990s, it is possible that
conclusions would be modified somewhat because of the growth of temporary employment.  But
the existence of temporary worker does not seem to drive the results here.
Summarizing, the middle levels of the typical firm account for most white-collar workers
and the most white-collar hiring.  There is a tendency for workers to be hired in at lower levels than
they end up.  There are ports of entry in that people tend to enter at different levels than they end up,
but the extreme version of internal labor markets story does not seem to hold. A substantial fraction
of workers are not hired in at the bottom, but rather at positions close to the ones they currently hold.
 
B. Disaggregation of Firms
Up to this point, the data has been analyzed as if it all came from one large firm.  The reality
is that these data represent as many as 7,267 firms. Now consider how the patterns documented so24
far vary across firms in the sample. Differences in firm size naturally generate some heterogeneity,
but the rest of this section looks at heterogeneity in ports-of-entry across reasonably similar firms.
The 100 firms (as of 1988) with the most employees in the sample are considered, conditional on
the firm having employees at all five of the levels analyzed in Table 3.
It is possible to get at the issue using analysis of variance. Let the dependent variable be the
internal hiring rate and let the unit of analysis be the job within the firm. In the sample of the 100
largest firms, each having five levels, up to 51 occupation families, and up to 252 jobs, there are
6,306 observations for this regression. How much of the variation in the internal hiring rate is due
to jobs, occupation, and level and how much is due to firm fixed effects?
Panel A of Table 6 starts with a regression that includes firm and job indicator variables.
Both the collection of firm fixed effects and the group of job indicators are significant as a group.
That is, the hypothesis that these 100 firms have the same tendency to hire from within can be
rejected, as can the hypothesis that the internal hiring rates are the same at each job in the typical
firm. However, the job fixed effects are far more powerful than the firm fixed effects. The majority
of job fixed effects are statistically different from the median job fixed effect, while only fifteen of
the firm fixed effects are statistically significant.
Panel B of the table shows that just these five levels are responsible for much of the
explanatory power of jobs. Firm, occupation family, and level fixed effects are each jointly
significant, but the five level indicators explain more of the across job variation in internal entry
rates than the combination of occupation and firm.
There are examples of firms that have particularly strong promote-from-within tendencies.
For example, 21 of the 100 firms source at least 50% of workers in each of levels 2 through 5 from25
another level in the firm. Eight of the 100 get at least 60% of their workers internally at each of these
levels, while only one firm gets at least 75% internally at each of these levels. In terms of firms
showing a strong tendency to hire externally, only one firm hired fewer than 50% of its workers at
every level from another level internally.
In general, while there are differences across firms, the primary influence is the level. Low
levels have significant amounts of external hiring and high levels are dominated by promotion from
within. Tables 1, 2, and 3 suggest that the use of promote-from-within policies are the rule among
most firms and at some firms, these human resource policies dominate the hiring and promotion
process. However, all the tables discussed thus far make it clear that most firms also show at least
some willingness to fill positions at all levels externally.
C. Discussion
The data are inconsistent with the caricature version of ports-of-entry.  It is clear that in the
typical firm, workers are hired from outside at virtually every level.  Even among the most extreme
firms in terms of internal hiring,  it can be said that external hiring is significant.  For example, even
at the highest levels, the typical large firm hires an average of 15% of its workers from the outside.
But it is also true that hiring from the outside is much rarer at the top of the firm than at the bottom.
The corresponding portion of those hired from the outside at level 2 is nearly seventy percent.  In
firms of all types (in terms of total number of levels) shown in Table 1, the pattern is the same.
There is plenty of internal job filling, especially at the top of the firm, but even at the very top, every
type of firm category uses external hiring.
The data also show that transition from lower to higher levels is common in most firms.26
Table 3 shows that almost two-thirds of workers who have been with the firm at least ten years move
up at least one level from the level into which they were hired.  Not surprisingly, entry at lower
levels with promotion to higher levels is a very common practice in the typical firm.  But again, at
any point in time, a large number of workers are at the level into which they were hired.  The
snapshot analysis in Table 3 shows that even at level 5, a larger number of employees were hired
into that level than into any other single level.
In general, this labor market seems to provide enough mobility for a substantial amount of
competitive pressure, given that markets can be arbitraged with very little actual movement. The
findings are consistent with the tournament view of the labor market, especially as supplemented
by Chan (1996). Hiring into high levels of the firm is primarily from within.  The higher level jobs
draw most of their talent from inside in order to provide appropriate incentives, but if there is a
sufficiently dominant outsider, firms hire into the position from the outside.  Internal promotion is
preferred to external hiring because it provides better incentives for workers at lower levels in the
firm.  If workers know that they must compete with a large pool of outsiders for a particular job,
their incentives are diluted because the chances that their increased effort can affect the probability
of winning against such a large pool of competitors are slight.  If the pool is narrowed to insiders,
incentives are enriched.  Occasionally, however, insiders are so dominated by an outsider that it pays
to hire the outsider over promoting the insiders even at the cost of diminished incentives.  But such
cases should be relatively rare.  The pattern in the data seems consistent with this view.
Furthermore, if the value of effort is higher at the top of the hierarchy, providing incentives to high
level workers is especially important, which could explain why firms are reluctant to hire from the
outside at top levels.27
The data are also consistent with models of firms valuing a mix of firm-specific and general
human capital. Suppose that a significant fraction of human capital is firm-specific, which gives
insiders an edge over outsiders. Most promotion would be from within and this would be most true
at the top, where workers possess the greatest quantities of firm-specific human capital.  But,
occasionally an outsider comes along who so dominates insiders that it is worth hiring him even
though he does not possess the firm-specific human capital of the incumbents.  This interpretation,
however, may be inconsistent with the homogeneity in the promotion policies and the fact that
promotion-from-within policies are not highly correlated across levels within firms. That is, one
might expect that there are some firms where firm-specific human capital is very important and
others where it is not. In this case, the firm effects in Table 6 would be important, indicating that
firms that promote from within at one level also do so at other levels. The failure to find large firm
fixed effects in Table 6 somewhat undermines the human capital explanation for our findings.
Given the amount of external hiring that occurs at every level, it would be somewhat
surprising to find that firms are insulated from market forces.  If other firms are hiring even high-
level workers from outside, a firm would seem to be forced to meet market wages in order to retain
labor.  The next section looks carefully at this issue of the relationship between individual wages
and market wages.
V. The Relationship Between “Internal” and Market Wages
A. Basic Structure of Wages and Wage Changes
The simplest way to get a sense for the effect of internal labor markets on wages is to look28
at how important firm effects are in a wage regression. Panel A of Table 7 presents results of an
analysis of variance of wages on firm, occupation, region and year indicator variables. The sample
is the white collar workers at the 100 largest firms in the SAF sample (as of 1988) and an
observation is a person/year between 1984 and 1990.  The dependent variable is log wages and
explanatory variables include firm indicators, job indicators (where a job is defined to be a unique
BNT code), 25 region indicators, and year indicator variables. Including firm and job effects leads
to explaining a much higher proportion (r-square = 82%) of the variation than in a typical wage
regression, even though the explanatory variables do not include demographic characteristics.
Year and occupation account for the bulk of explanatory power.  Although there are almost
three times as many occupation categories as firms, occupation accounts for almost 100 times as
much of the variance as firm and an even higher proportion than region.  Jobs matter, therefore, in
a consistent way across the market.  Wage levels are in large part dictated by occupation, at least in
the cross section.  This finding is consistent with a spot labor market where wages are determined
by the market at the level of the job.
The result is also consistent with centralized wage setting, where firms have no discretion
over wages paid once they have been centrally set.  As long as firms were free to hire from the
outside, this would not be inconsistent with the view that firms buy in an external labor market,
albeit a wage-administered rather than competitive one.  However, even this view is not quite
accurate.  The ANOVA on wage levels shown above reveals that even holding detailed job constant,
the r-square is 82%, implying that 18% is left unexplained.  Also, as shown below, there is important17“Wage drift,” as it is termed in Sweden, refers to wages that drift upward above the
level determined by centralized wage bargaining.
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short-term variation in wages by firm that does not reflect centralized wage bargaining.
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However, collective agreements are clearly important because, though firm effects matter,
the explanatory power of the regression barely changes when firm effects are removed.  The r-square
falls to 81.24%. Given that the job is the unit of negotiation in centralized wage bargaining, it seems
that firms exert some, but not a great deal of, discretion in setting wages, at least over the long run
where wage levels are effective. Below, it will be shown that firms do have significant discretion
in setting wages in the short run.
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of wage variation within occupations. The figure
shows kernel density estimates of 1988 wages for all workers in one of the largest occupation
families – construction. As the figures shows, there is some heterogeneity across levels in wages and
there is considerable overlap in the ranges of wages for each of the neighboring levels.
The results for wage changes are different.  Panel B of Table 7 reports the corresponding
analysis of variance for wage changes. Once again, time effects are key.  There are high raise years
and low raise years. But now, firm effects become more important than occupation effects.
Apparently, over the short run, firms can adjust wages in ways that take into account their own
idiosyncratic situation.  But over the long run, as reflected in wage levels, they must bring them into
line with other wages in the occupation in order to meet competitive pressure. 
In some sense, the result is obvious.  Engineers are likely to earn significantly more than
secretaries even if both happen to have been in the same firm during the same period.  The firm
effects that exert an influence on raises in the short run cannot be expected to alter the entire30
structure of wages in any significant sense.  The basic pattern of occupational wage differences
would be expected to prevail, despite the short-run importance of firm effects.
B. Discussion
As demonstrated by Figure 1, neither the results on wage determination nor the results on
entry taken independently are sufficient to draw definitive conclusions about the prevalence of
internal or external labor markets. But the evidence on both wages and internal and external hiring
patterns rules out pure internal labor markets.  There is significant outside hiring at higher levels in
the typical firm and there is clearly co-movement of wages, as reflected in the ANOVA results.
There is considerable promotion and filling of jobs at higher levels from within. Internal mobility
plays a significant role in filling higher level jobs in all firms.  However, a non-trivial fraction of
workers are hired from the outside even at the highest levels in the typical firm.  Furthermore, there
is no evidence of a unique pattern of entry and movement within firms.  Most workers who end up
at relatively high levels in the firm were hired in at a high level.  Those workers who are hired in at
very low levels of the firm do not account for the bulk of workers at the higher level of the typical
firm.
Wages do exhibit significant co-movement within occupation. Although there are important
firm-specific variations in the size of raises from one year to the next, the wage level regressions
imply that adjustment over the longer term results in wages that are very much in line with an
external labor market.  This evidence is also consistent with a market that is disciplined by external
forces (at least over the long run).  In the shorter term, it appears that firms have some discretion
over wage setting.31
C. Entry and Exit Rates 
Most of the discussion has been in terms of firms being able to hire from the outside.  To the
extent that firms hire from the outside, then it would appear that workers can obtain jobs even at
high levels in other firms.  Although this may not be as common as obtaining a high level job in
one’s own firm, the fact that hiring from the outside is common means that there is pressure on the
a worker’s current firm to keep pace with the market in order to retain workers.  
Another constraint may be the ability of firms to fire workers.  This also creates a deviation
from what is normally thought of as a functioning external labor market.  Were firms prevented from
firing workers, there would be less hiring from the outside and the workers would be somewhat
insulated from the market.  This does not imply that their wages would be protected.  It is the
coupling of job protection with wage protection that creates the problem for employers because
allowing employers sufficient discretion over wages would be tantamount to allowing them to
terminate their workers.  By offering a low enough wage, the worker could be induced to quit.  
Given the centralized bargaining and importance of job effects discussed above, it is likely
that employers do not have such discretion over workers’ wages.  It is therefore instructive to look
at generalized labor turnover.  
Table 5 provides results that speak to this issue. First note from panel A that almost 12% of
the jobs that exist in any given year in the typical firm are held by individuals who were not
employed by that firm last year. Thus, the typical firm is hiring in about 12% of its labor needs every
year. Furthermore, even at the highest levels of the firm, almost 7% are hired in from the outside.
These facts suggest that workers do indeed have somewhere to go; they are not locked into their32
current firms. Second, the fact that 12% are hired from the outside implies that the firm must resort
to an external labor market for a significant fraction of its employees.
Separation rates are also significant at the typical firm. Although these data do not allow us
to distinguish between quits and layoffs, Table 5 does reveal that over 9% of the typical firms’
workers leave each year. Although this number is lower than that of some other countries’ labor
markets, it does, coupled with hiring numbers, suggest that mobility into and out of firms is
substantial, even in a highly centralized labor market as Sweden’s.
VI. Conclusion
The results on both mobility and wage setting suggest that at least over the long run, external
labor market wage setting is an important force in Swedish labor markets.   Although there is much
promotion and job filling especially at high levels from within, there is significant hiring from the
outside at all levels of the typical firm’s hierarchy. 
Furthermore, wage levels seemed to be accounted for primarily by occupation, especially
level of the job, and time. Idiosyncratic firm-based wage movements are important over the short-
run, but in the longer term, occupation is a more important determinant of wages, suggesting that
firms are disciplined to a large degree by the external labor market in their wage setting. 
The results in no way imply that labor markets in Sweden are efficient and undistorted. The
fact that firms must compete with each other for labor does not mean that centralized wage setting
and other institutional factors do not play an important role in labor markets, perhaps distorting
behavior significantly. The evidence that is presented in this paper sheds no light on this more
fundamental question.33
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Table 1
Panel A: Proportion in a Level who Moved into that Level Internally
Total # of Levels
Level 1234567
1 32.00% 29.83% 29.57% 27.01% 23.85% 25.54% 24.19%
2 51.81% 54.14% 50.75% 41.81% 35.83% 32.08%
3 67.21% 68.55% 65.47% 64.72% 33.78%
4 76.10% 79.96% 80.38% 65.25%





1 3,019 2,665 3,534 2,888 2,210 1,163 215
2 2,239 4,010 6,414 7,000 6,300 1,275
3 2,461 4,839 9,295 14,486 7,036
4 2,247 4,397 12,445 16,315
5 1,676 5,075 10,044
6 1,389 3,094
7 648
# firms 2,086 1,461 1,464 1,124 699 331 102
Employee levels and the number of levels in firm based on 1988. Employees whose 1988 level is
the same as their level when the firm first enters the dataset are dropped.36
Table 1
Panel B: Proportion in a Job/Wage Level who Moved into that Level Internally




1 39.87% 40.41% 38.48% 35.80% 42.49%
2 56.88% 57.01% 54.92% 51.21%







1 3,737 3,180 3,966 3,008 5,396
2 2,421 4,392 7,134 22,105
3 2,580 4,798 45,416
4 2,186 28,213
5 9,705
# firms 3,568 1,708 1,444 957 722
“Job/Wage Level” is defined by taking the average wage of all employees in a given job as of 1988
and then dividing these jobs into five quintiles based on this average wage. “Job/Wage level” of 1
indicates the job is in the bottom quintile of average wages, 2 is the second quintile, etc. Proportion
in top part of table is the proportion of people in a Job/Wage Level as of 1988 whose first job at their
1988 employer was in a different Job/Wage Level. Employees for whom it is not clear if their 1988
job was their first at a given employer were dropped.37
Table 2
Ratio of Number Hired Into Level to Number Currently In Level
Firm/level Total Total Cum Cum  Cum Cum 
Level Median Mean cells Avg/cell Hired in
Level
Hired EmplHire % Employ
%
1 2.00 2.96 512 7.83 10,582 4,010 10,582 4,010 0.175 0.066
2 1.29 1.60 492 30.54 25,096 15,028 35,678 19,038 0.589 0.314
3 0.76 0.83 493 50.31 18,270 24,805 53,948 43,843 0.890 0.723
4 0.50 0.56 451 27.22 5,014 12,277 58,962 56,120 0.973 0.926
5 0.40 0.46 512 8.78 1,651 4,493 60,613 60,613 1.000 1.000
Total 0.95 1.30 2460 24.64 60,613 60,613
Sample is limited to employees for whom their job when they first began working for their 1988
employer is available. Those 42% of the 1988 sample employees who were hired before their
firm enters the sample are dropped. The two highest levels are combined into level 5 and the two
lowest into level 1. Firms that did not have employees at both levels 1 and 5 in 1988 are
dropped. “Median” is the median across all firms at a given level of (# employees currently at
the firm who started at the firm in that level)/(# in the level at the firm in 1988). “Mean” is the
average across all firms of this same ratio.38
Table 3
Entry Level by Current Level
Panel A: All employees, level changes only
Entry Level
1988 Level 12345 U n k n o w n T o t a l
1 4,257 325 31 0 0 1,626 6,239
2 4,006 12,469 519 35 2 7,868 24,899
3 2,852 11,333 12,987 336 26 18,941 46,475
4 703 3,183 5,358 3,832 167 14,503 27,746
5 102 510 1,247 1,275 1,583 5,989 10,706
Total 11,920 27,820 20,142 5,478 1,778 48,927 116,065
Summary: Lower triangle, 45.5%; Diagonal, 52.3%, Upper triangle, 2.1%
Panel B: All employees, level and occupation changes
Entry Level
1988 Level 1 2 3 4 5 Unknown Different
Occupat.
Total
1 3,548 99 2 0 0 698 1,892 6,239
2 2,439 10,727 222 12 1 4,168 7,330 24,899
3 1,384 7,788 10,827 152 6 10,217 16,101 46,475
4 238 1,620 3,323 3,144 83 6,952 12,386 27,746
5 20 189 569 748 1,271 2,495 5,414 10,706
Total 7,629 20,423 14,943 4,056 1,361 24,530 43,123116,065
Summary: Lower triangle, 37.8%; Diagonal, 61.0%, Upper triangle, 1.2%39
Table 3 (cont.)




12345 U n k n o w n T o t a l
1 835 161 16 0 0 1,150 2,162
2 1,467 2,349 215 20 1 4,879 8,931
3 1,562 3,916 2,160 138 17 12,286 20,079
4 505 1,759 2,089 756 92 10,455 15,656
5 83 348 789 602 465 4,625 6,912
Total 4,452 8,533 5,269 1,516 575 33,395 53,740
Summary: Lower triangle, 64.5%; Diagonal, 32.3%, Upper triangle, 3.2%
Notes to all panels: The two highest levels are combined into level 5 and the two lowest into level
1. Firms that did not have employees at both levels 1 and 5 in 1988 are dropped.40
Table 4
Job Tenure by Level
Both Sides
All Observ. Uncensored Left Censored Right Censored Censored
Level Mean # obs Mean # obs Mean # obs Mean # obs Mean # obs
1 1.85 117,688 1.63 77,735 1.94 22,805 2.64 14,891 3.02 2,257
2 2.66 291,391 2.25 181,325 2.99 50,219 3.46 52,110 4.79 7,737
3 3.22 343,097 2.87 205,814 3.52 45,444 3.70 82,159 5.40 9,680
4 3.44 174,643 3.08 101,247 3.70 21,063 3.85 47,568 5.90 4,765
5 3.32 69,601 3.00 41,425 3.39 8,631 3.88 17,667 4.85 1,878
         











Mean job tenure is average number of years in the specific job (that is, occupation/level
combination).
Censoring Methodology:
The two highest levels are combined into level 5 and the two lowest into level 1. Firms that did not
have employees at both levels 1 and 5 at some point while in the sample are dropped. An
observation is an individual spell of employment in one level at one firm. A job is “left censored”
if the employee was working in that job in the first year in which his firm was in the available
dataset. A job is “right censored” if the employee was working in that job in the last year in which
his firm was in the available dataset. 41
Table 5
Job Entry and Job Exit Rates by Level
Panel A: Full Sample
External Internal External Internal
Level Entry Entry Exit Exit Observations
1 22.45% 9.24% 12.29% 20.41% 276,102
2 15.44% 9.95% 9.52% 14.83% 874,621
3 10.03% 13.03% 8.79% 10.75% 1,179,978
4 6.90% 15.47% 8.63% 9.37% 624,829
5 6.72% 15.78% 10.49% 8.27% 245,274
Total 11.72% 12.55% 9.39% 12.24% 3,200,804
Panel B: Employers between 40 and 45 Years Old
External Internal External Internal
Level Entry Entry Exit Exit Observations
1 8.50% 9.82% 8.09% 12.96% 86,785
2 6.59% 7.73% 6.79% 9.89% 333,454
3 5.03% 9.23% 6.78% 8.07% 525,140
4 4.50% 10.73% 7.18% 7.93% 349,696
5 5.10% 11.91% 9.53% 7.55% 172,344
Total 5.47% 9.60% 7.28% 8.68% 1,467,419
An observation is a person/year. An observation is defined as an “external entry” if the person is
not working at the firm in year t and works at the firm in a given job in year t + 1. The other
entry and exit variables are defined similarly.  The first and last year that any firm is in the
dataset is dropped from the sample.42
Table 6
Analysis of Variance – Internal Entry Rate
Dependent Variable = Fraction of workers in a job at a firm that 
moved to that job from another job at the same firm
Panel A: Firms and Jobs
Type of Indicator # of Indicators Partial Sum of
Squares
P-value
Firm 100 35.68 0.000
Jobs 252 198.30 0.000
 Total 753.31
Regression of internal movement rate for 6,306 firm/job combinations. R-square = 31.88%. Sample
includes white-collar workers at 100 largest firms in SAF dataset. An observation is a firm/job in
1988.
Panel B: Firms, Levels, and Occupation Groups
Type of Indicator # of Indicators Partial Sum of
Squares
P-value
Firm 100 36.51 0.000
Occupation 51 40.55 0.000
Level 5 85.26 0.000
 Total 753.31
Regression of internal movement rate for 6,306 firm/job combinations. R-square = 23.86%. Sample




Panel A: Wage Levels
Dependent Variable = Ln(wage)
Type of Indicator # of Indicators
(Partial Sum of Squares)
# of Indicators

















Total Sum of Squares 57,342.81 57,342.81
Regressions of wages for 584,635 worker/years. Sample includes white-collar workers at 100 largest
firms in SAF dataset. An observation is a worker/year between 1984 and 1990.44
Table 7 (cont.)
Panel B: Wage Changes
Dependent Variable = Change in Ln(wage) from previous year
Type of Indicator # of Indicators
(Partial Sum of Squares)
# of Indicators

















Total Sum of Squares 1,429.49 1,429.49
Regression of wages for 415,606 worker/years. Sample includes white-collar workers at the 97 of
the 100 largest firms in SAF dataset for which wage change data is available. An observation is a
worker/year between 1985 and 1990.45
Figure 1
Identification of Labor Market Fluidity
Hiring at higher levels of firm









Inconsistent with both spot
and internal labor markets 
Internal labor market46
Figure 2




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ 7  l evel   firm s47
Figure 3
Cumulative Wage Distribution
Sample includes all employees in 1988. Wage is Swedish Kroners per month.
 48
Figure 4
Wage Distribution at Largest Firm
Sample includes 7417 employees of a single firm in 1988. 49
Figure 5
Wage Distribution of Construction Occupation
Figure 5A: Wage Levels
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Level 2 Level 3
Level 4 Level 550
Appendix
Description of Positions in SAF Data
Occupation Family 1: Occupation # 120 – Manufacturing, Repair, Maintenance, and Transportation
11% of 1988 sample
There is no level 1 in this occupation.
Level 2 (4% of occupation #120 employees) – Assistant for unit; insures instructions are followed; monitors
processes
Level 3 (46%) – In charge of a unit of 15-35 people
Level 4 (45%) – In charge of 30-90 people; does investigations of disruptions and injuries
Level 5 (4%) – In charge of 90-180 people; manages more complicated tasks
Level 6 (0.3%) – Manages 180 or more people
There is no level 7 in this occupation.
Occupation Family 2: Occupation #310 – Construction
10% of the 1988 sample
Level 1 (0.1%) – Cleans sketches; writes descriptions
Level 2 (1%) – Does more advanced sketches
Level 3 (12%) – Simple calculations regarding dimensions, materials, etc.
Level 4 (45%) – Chooses components; does more detailed sketches and descriptions; estimates costs
Level 5 (32%) – Designs mechanical products and technical products; does investigations; has 3 or more
subordinates at lower levels
Level 6 (8%) – Executes complex calculations; checks materials; leads construction work; has 3 or more
subordinates at level 5
Level 7 (1%) – Same as level 6 plus has 2-5 level 6 subordinates
Occupation Family 3: Occupation #800 – Marketing and Sales
19% of 1988 sample
Level 1 (0.2%) – Telesales; expedites invoices; files
Level 2 (6%) – Puts together orders; distributes price and product information
Level 3 (29%) – Seeks new clients for 1-3 products; can sign orders; does market surveys
Level 4 (38%) – Sells more and more complex products; negotiates bigger orders; manages 3 or more subordinates
Level 5 (20%) – Manages budgets; develops products; manages 3 or more level 4 workers
Level 6 (7%) – Organizes, plans, and evaluates salesforce; does more advanced budgeting; manages 3 or more level
5 workers
Level 7 (1%) – Same as level 6 plus 2-5 level 6 subordinates
Occupation Family 4: Occupation #900 – Finance
5% of 1988 sample
Level 1 (1%) – Office work; bookkeeping; invoices; bank verification
Level 2 (7%) – Manages petty cash; calculates salaries
Level 3 (18%) – More advanced accounting; 4-10 subordinates
Level 4 (31%) – Places liquid assets; manages lenders; evaluates credit of buyers; manages 3 or more level 3
employees
Level 5 (28%) – Financial planning; analyzes markets; manages portfolios; currency transfers; manages 3 or more
level 4 employees
Level 6 (12%) – Manages credits; plan routines within the organization; forward-looking budgeting; manages 3 or
more level 5 employees
Level 7 (2%) – Same as level 6 plus 2-5 level 6 subordinates